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Between perception and action there are close parallels. 
Perception, for example, is said to have a success element. If a person 
sees an object, then the object must be in front of her. Something similar 
seems to hold in the domain of action. If someone acts for a reason, then 
her action must be reasonable in the light of what the person intends. 
In both domains there are illusions. In perception, these refer to 
episodes where things don’t appear to normal subjects the way they are. In 
action, they refer to situations in which competent and willful agents fall 
short of acting as intended. Further, from the perspective of subjects and 
agents, illusions are indistinguishable relative to their successful 
counterparts.  
 To account for their indistinguishability, perception theorists have 
introduced perceptual experiences. These are supposed to be the common 
factor shared by perception and illusion. The idea constitutes the core claim 
behind the argument from illusion, which Hume famously proposed to 
challenge a naïve form of realism in perception. This parallelism also 
extends to the domain of action. Or so I argue in what follows.  
The focus of this paper is slips. A slip is a common kind of mistake, 
which is like an illusion, but in the domain of action. As we shall see, 
between the slip and the successful action there is also a common element. 
Briefly, both involve a competent attempt to execute an intention. Thus, in the 
domain of action an argument similar to the argument from illusion can be 
given. The argument challenges a widespread view about action inspired 
by Wittgenstein, which by analogy, I shall call “naïve rationalism.” 
 The paper begins by recounting Hume’s argument. Then, I present 
the main ideas behind the naïve rationalist view, sketching one prominent 
version of it originally due to G. E. M. Anscombe. With this in mind, I 
introduce slips and present the argument based on them. In the end, I 
discuss a pair of objections analogous to some common objections raised in 
the perceptual case. Their discussion helps sharpen some of the main 
points of the debate and illuminates the general picture of action that 





1. The argument from illusion 
 
Philosophers of perception are familiar with the argument from illusion, at 
least since Hume’s formulation of it in the last pages of the Enquiry 
(1748/1975: XII, 1. 118). Hume introduced the argument to criticize what he 
took to be a naïve form of realism about perception and to suggest how 
awareness of the problems intrinsic to such realism would raise skeptical 
worries: 
  
The mind has never anything present to it but its perceptions, 
and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection 
with their objects. The supposition of such a connection is, 
therefore, without any foundation in reasoning (XII, 1. 119). 
 
Ever since, different versions of the argument have been 
propounded, mostly to defend a variety of positive conclusions regarding 
the nature of perception—for instance, to defend sense-datum theories 
(Ayer 1969; Robinson 1994). Here, however, the argument will be taken in 
its purely negative form. As such, it is meant to show that, contrary to the 
kind of realism Hume was criticizing, objects and state of affairs are not 
directly perceived.1       
The argument starts from the existence of illusions. An illusion is a 
perceptual episode that involves error, in the sense that the perceived 
object appears different from what it really is. The error is not due to the 
perceiver having false beliefs; it is a perceptual, not a doxastic error. 
Further, from the subject’s perspective, illusions and genuine perceptions 
are supposed to be indistinguishable. In the absence of background 
information, the person under the illusion is not normally in a position to 
know of her being subject to it.  
Now, to the extent that illusions are indistinguishable, perception is 
supposed to involve two elements. This, at least, is the core of the 
argument. First, there is a perceptual experience, which is the common factor 
with perception and which accounts for the indistinguishability of 
illusions. Second, there is the correct determination of that experience by a 
mind-independent object or state of affairs. It is by virtue of that 
                                                            
1 I cannot do justice to the many versions of the argument here. Many of 
them are, in fact, stronger than the one intended here. For recent examples, 
see Robinson (1994), Smith (2002) and Crane (2011). In what follows, I shall 
be mainly concerned with the “negative” portion of the argument, for 
instance, as Fish discusses it (2009: 29-33)  
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determination that having the experience counts as a genuine episode of 
perception and not as an illusion.  
Given this, the challenge to naïve realism follows. In holding that 
perception is direct, the naïve realist is claiming that the things perceived 
are constitutive of the kind of mental state that perception is.2 In their 
absence, one would be in an altogether different mental state. Yet, if the 
above proposal goes through, this doesn’t seem to be the case. According to 
it, perception essentially involves having some kind of experience. But, as 
illusions seem to suggest, an experience of that kind can occur, even if 
those properties or state of affairs do not obtain.  
As I said, the argument from illusion might be taken to help establish 
various conclusions about perception. But, strictly speaking, these do not 
follow from it (at least, not from the version of the argument considered 
here). In particular, to conclude that perception is not direct is not to state 
that one perceives the external world by virtue of perceiving an experience, 
or to postulate an inner object with the perceived characteristics. Both of 
these theses, which are admittedly suggested in Hume’s quotation above, 
evidently require additional argumentation.3  
By contrast, the claim that perception is indirect is more modest. 
Briefly put, it amounts to saying that perception involves having 
experiences that are world involving and yet not settled by world.4 They are 
world involving, in the sense that they involve an encounter with objects 
and state of affairs in the world. But they are not settled by it because the 
objects and state of affairs encountered need not be those that would make 
the experience veridical.  
 
2. Naïve rationalism 
 
According to naïve realists, perceptual episodes are constituted by mind-
independent objects and states of affairs. In this respect, their view 
contrasts with other realist views in perception, most notably, with 
                                                            
2 For explications of the directness of perception in terms of constitution, see 
Langsam (1997), Martin (2006: 273) and Fish (2009: 5-16). 
3 Millar (2007: 182-184) discusses various ways in which advocates of the 
argument from illusion can develop their views without committing 
themselves to these claims 
4 Antony (2011) draws a similar contrast between an experience being 
world involving but not world-determined. As she puts it, an experience is 
not world determined in that its character is not entirely determined by the 
objects encountered. 
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standard causal accounts. For the latter, perception involves a causal 
relation between an experience and the things perceived. And whereas that 
relation makes the experience count as perception (as opposed to, say, a 
hallucination), being extrinsic it is not one of constitution.  
Many philosophers have endorsed an analogous position in relation 
to action. Although it has never been explicitly characterized as such, one 
can find versions of it in some contemporary accounts of action inspired by 
Wittgenstein. The view, which can be called naïve rationalism, is centered on 
the role reasons play in the determination of action.5 Ultimately, it boils 
down to the claim that in so far as actions are done for reasons, those 
reasons are constitutive of them. As in perception, the view is about 
constitution and success: the successful episode (action) is held to be 
constituted by those things in terms of which its success is defined (the 
reasons).  
Naïve rationalism contrasts with causal approaches to action. The 
latter typically characterize actions (to be precise, intentional actions) as 
events or behaviors appropriately caused by reasons. To be sure, the causal 
aspect of these accounts can be and has been developed in different ways.6 
For the present comparison, however, what is essential to note is that in so 
far as causal approaches take reasons and actions to be metaphysically 
separate existences, the constitution claim that defines the naïve rationalist 
point of view clearly diverges from them.7 
Historically speaking, traces of naïve rationalism can be found 
behind the logical connection argument defended by philosophers of action 
of the 1950-60s. This is the argument that explanations by reasons are not 
causal because actions and reasons are logically connected. A. I. Melden 
(1961), one of its most vocal supporters, was emphatic to deny that 
intentions and motives existed independently of the actions they explained. 
                                                            
5 By “reasons,” one can understand here the considerations that motivate 
the agent to perform the action, or the agent’s attitudes towards those 
considerations. Either way, the intended parallelism with naïve realism 
holds. 
6 See, for instance, the essays in Aguilar and Buckareff (2010). 
7 Some “componential” theories of action are hybrid in this regard (for 
example, Searle 1983 and Dretske 1988). In them, reasons and intentions are 
causes, and actions are processes constituted by these causal elements. 
These positions, however, are closer in spirit to the causal approach, so I do 
not count them as versions of naïve rationalism. Obviously, there are tricky 
issues here, but sorting them out would require a detailed discussion of the 
specifics of these views. 
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Rather, he thought they were aspects of the action, whose mention made 
explicit its connection to the context in which it happened and to agent 
performing it. This is why he thought reason explanations were not causal. 
For him, the logical connection between reasons and actions was a 
manifestation of their metaphysical non-distinctness. 
More recently, action theorists following G. E. M. Anscombe have 
proposed a more sophisticated version of the view.8 The cornerstone of 
their account is her famous dictum that practical knowledge is the cause of 
what it understands (Anscombe 1963: §48). As with many other key 
passages of Intention, much could be said about this one. What is important 
here though is Anscombe’s idea that the relation between practical 
knowledge and its objects, which are the agent’s intentional actions, is 
exactly the opposite of what that relation is like in the case of speculative 
knowledge. Whereas to count as knowledge speculation must match its 
objects, in the practical case the onus of the match is supposed to be on the 
action. 
Let me explain. As Anscombe’s interpreters have pointed out, it 
would be a mistake to understand “cause” in her dictum as causal theorists 
of perception or action use the term (Hursthouse 2001, Paul 2011, Ford et al 
2011: 18). Instead, the appeal to causation is meant to invoke what is 
sometimes referred to as Aristotelian formal causation. Roughly speaking, a 
thing’s formal cause is not something that exists independently of it. It is 
something that constitutes it in the sense of being a part or an aspect of it, 
which makes it the thing it is. Think, for example, of the way the form of 
the statue and the statue itself are related. The former is not a separate 
existence (as Platonists would say). It is an aspect of it that determines the 
kind of object the statue is. 
According to Anscombe, practical knowledge bears precisely this 
kind of relationship to the actions of which it is about. In this regard, it is 
very much unlike speculative knowledge, which is supposed to be derived 
from its objects. To the extent that practical knowledge shapes what the 
agent does, her intentional actions do not exist independently of it. They 
are not, say, events waiting to be know by her. Rather, her actions have a 
teleological structure, which is essential to them—it always makes sense to 
ask why and how they are performed. And that structure is not given to 
them by something extrinsic or external. Instead, it is built into them by 
virtue of being displays of the agent’s practical knowledge.  
                                                            
8  For versions of this Neo-Anscombean view, see Hursthouse (2000), Vogler 
(2001), and Ford (2015). For discussion, see Paul (2011) and Milgram (2012), 
who calls this the calculative view of action. 
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It is here where naïve rationalism comes in. For Anscombe, as for 
the action theorists following her, intentional actions are not always done 
for reasons. Also, one can do things basically in the sense that one can do 
them and not be able to say how one does them. Yet, whenever an action is 
either done for a reason or is not basic, the action has a rich teleological 
structure. In virtue of it, some descriptions apply to it and some do not 
apply. Importantly for present purposes, such structure is supposed to be 
constituted by the agent’s reasons, as embodied in the considerations that 
she would invoke were she asked to explain why she does the action or how 
she does it.9  
As an illustration, consider Anscombe’s famous pumping example. 
As she notes, what the man does there can be correctly described in various 
ways: “pumping water into the house,” “poisoning the inhabitants,” etc., 
According to the view under discussion, however, those descriptions only 
count as correct descriptions of what the man did to the extent that they 
articulate the reasons for which he acts. That is, setting aside the 
movements of the man’s body or their mere consequences in the world, 
there is no available description of his action except by introducing his 
reasons. He does what he does in order to poison the inhabitants; he does it 
by pumping water into the house, etc. 
With this, we can go back to Anscombe’s dictum. To claim that in 
the domain of practical knowledge the onus of the match lies on the agent’s 
actions is not, in the light of what has been said, merely to define a 
condition for successful action, say that one’s actions ought to match one’s 
reasons for doing them. It is, further, to build its success conditions into the 
very nature of the action. In short, in so far as actions have essentially a 
teleological structure of means and ends, this structure is given to them by 
the way the agent’s reasons are articulated. It is the latter that makes 
actions what they are, namely, doings about which it makes sense to ask 




                                                            
9 Candace Vogler, who develops a Neo-Anscombean account along these 
lines, puts it as follows: “Getting an accurate description of the event in 
question, of the intentional action as an intentional action, is (at least) 
getting a description of its rational articulation, of the intended end and the 
means or parts done in order to attain, or make it possible to attain, the end 
(2001: 445).”  
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Whereas illusions have played a major role in philosophical discussions 
about perception, in action theory they have hardly been discussed. For the 
most part, theorists have focused on successful episodes of agency. 
Whenever they have discussed errors, the cases discussed tend to involve 
mistakes due to ignorance or akrasia. Or they tend to refer to mistakes that 
occur because of the agent’s lack of ability. In other words, the mistakes 
discussed tend to be those that we make as believers or desirers, or that 
prevent us from acting as agents. There are not the mistakes that we make 
qua agents.10 
Illusions, however, are common in the domain of action too. One can 
easily recognize this, thinking back on one’s own experience. By illusions, I 
refer here to situations in which well informed, willful, and competent 
agents fall short of acting as intended. Their lack of success is not 
necessarily traceable to their having false beliefs or lacking the relevant 
information. And their mistakes are inadvertent in the sense that to realize 
what they did wrong, agents need to step back and reflect on the larger 
context.  
Consider, as prime examples, slips.11 These are familiar occurrences. 
You call your partner by the name of your child. Or, heading home, you 
wind driving up by habit to your old place. Surely, you know the name of 
every family member. You know as well that you just moved to a different 
neighborhood. Yet, without even noticing it, you end up acting contrary to 
what you intended then.  
Some slips are caught almost as soon as they happen. You realize that 
you just blurt out the wrong name. Often, however, it takes a while to 
notice them. As you sit behind the wheel approaching the wrong driveway, 
it slowly dawns on you that you are not where you were supposed to be. 
Either way, until the mistake is caught, everything seems to go seamlessly. 
From your perspective as the agent making the mistake, it is action as 
usual. 
In general, slips can be characterized as a type of performance mistake. 
In them, the error does not lie with the judgment or the decision of the 
                                                            
10 Some exceptions can be found in Ruben-Hillel (1992) who discusses 
attentive miscalculations, Mele (2006) on lost intentions, and Peabody 
(2005) who uses slips to argue against Davidson’s theory of action 
11  For discussion of slips in everyday life and slip corpora, see Amaya 
(2013), Jónsdóttir et al (2007), Norman (1981), Reason and Mycielska (1982), 
Reason (1984); Sellen (1990). For a review of verbal slips and findings from 
corpora, see Baars (1992) and Poulisse (1999). 
 
 8 
agent but with the way these are carried out. In the slip, in fact, you 
normally intend to do things that would be judged acceptable all things 
considered, say, to get home after a hard day’s work. And you normally act 
motivated by those things without an inkling of hesitation. In those 
respects, the mistake does not impugn your judgment or the quality or 
strength of your will. 
Further, slips are errors of competent agents. As such, they differ from 
other kinds of performance mistakes, for instance, those that occur because 
one lacks the required abilities, or because one is forced to act in 
circumstances where one cannot exercise them well. Think about the verbal 
slip. Calling your partner by the right name was not something difficult to 
accomplish for you in either of these respects. It was not like calling 
someone you just met by the right name or like trying to find the 
appropriate wording for a sentence when nervously speaking in front of a 
crowd. 
Finally, slips also differ from behaviors that are beyond the agent’s 
direct control, for instance, the kind of compulsions observed in OCD 
patients or the tics characteristic of Tourette’s syndrome.12 In fact, a 
distinguishing mark of the slip is that it is a mistake with a quick and easy 
cure. That is, noticing the mismatch between intention and behavior is often 
enough to correct the mistake. One does need to make an effort, to fight an 
urge, or to try to get oneself in the right frame of mind. Normally, all one 
needs to do to get things right is to have another go at it.  
In sum, slips can be defined as actions contrary to a governing intention. 
At the time of the mistake, you form an intention to do something that is 
typically well within your power. And although you wind up not acting as 
intended (at least, given your beliefs), the intention sustains what you do. 
You set to act motivated by it. And what you do can easily be aligned with 
it. In fact, had you not acted on that intention or had you changed your 
mind midway, the slip would have not occurred.13   
 
                                                            
12 For reviews of the phenomenology of OCD and related pathologies, see 
Abramowitz and Houts (2005). See Cohen and Leckman (1992) and 
Schroeder (2007) for a description of Tourette’s syndrome.  
13 In claiming that slips are actions I do not mean to imply that they are 
intentional actions—or intentional under a description. Elsewhere, I argue 
that under a certain plausible understanding of what “intentional” means 
they are, in fact, intentional (Amaya, in prep). But this further claim is not 
necessary for present purposes. For what matters here, slips could be non-





4. The argument 
 
Hume’s challenge to naïve realism was not so much that illusions were 
inconsistent with it but that certain salient features of them were better 
accounted for once the position was given up. In particular, taking their 
subjective indistinguishability at face value, he thought that one could 
better explain the similarities between illusions and perceptions by positing 
perceptual experiences that were world involving without being 
constituted by the world.14 
In the domain of action, a structurally similar argument can be put 
forward. It starts from the existence of slips. A slip, as I said before, is an 
action contrary to a governing intention. That is, it involves acting on an 
intention but not acting as intended. Further, the behavior in the slip is 
normally indistinguishable from a successful performance. Not only from the 
agent’s perspective, the mistake typically unfolds without notice. Also, 
from a third person’s perspective, the mistake tends to look like a success. 
In the absence of background information about what the agent intended, 
observers normally do not recognize the performance as a slip.  
This, in fact, is one of the signatures of the mistake. Unlike other form 
of error in the execution of intentions, slips tend not to result in clumsy or 
inept performances but quite the opposite. Which means that, rather than 
being signs of incompetence, they are actually signs of a misplaced 
competence. Thus, even if you wind up not acting as intended, the resulting 
action is one that could easily pass for a success. Indeed, it would have 
been the correct thing to do had you intended something slightly different.15 
                                                            
14 Crane (2011: §2) presents a stronger version of the Humean argument. For 
him the crux of the argument is given by the fact that illusions seem 
incompatible with “the manifest nature of perception.” Partly because I 
doubt that there is something like the manifest nature of perception, I prefer 
the “weaker” version that only presupposes subjective indistinguishability 
between veridical and non-veridical experiences.  
15 This is, in fact, one of the main intuitions guiding Freud’s interpretation of 
slips as signs of a troubled conscience in his Psychopathology of Everyday Life. 
It should be noted, however, that Freud might have been ambivalent about 
this interpretation. See Timpanaro (1976: 128-132) for discussion of the 
passages evidencing the ambivalence. But see Grünbaum (1984) for a 
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Imagine, for example, that you had decided to go back to your old place to 
fetch something you left behind when you moved. Or, suppose that you 
had meant to get your child’s attention, instead of your partner’s. If this 
had been the case, what you did when you slipped would have been a 
success. 
Here is where the parallel with Hume’s argument comes in. To the 
extent that slips are indistinguishable from successful performances, 
successful action would seem to involve two distinct elements. First, there 
is an attempt to execute an intention, which is the common factor with slips 
and which accounts for their indistinguishability. Second, there is the 
correct determination of that attempt by the agent’s reasons. It is by virtue 
of that determination that the execution of the intention counts as a 
successful action and not merely as a slip. 
From this, the challenge to naïve rationalism follows. As mentioned 
earlier, for the naïve rationalist, the agent’s reasons are supposed to be 
constitutive of what she does. But the argument from slips, if sound, shows 
that this is not the case. Acting for a reason essentially involves an attempt 
to execute an intention. And whereas that attempt can be successfully 
shaped by the reasons behind the agent’s intention, it does not seem to be 
constituted by them. As the possibility of slipping suggests, an attempt of 
that kind can occur even if the agent does not have reasons that correctly 
align with it. 
Take again the Neo-Anscombean view outlined above. According to 
it, when an agent acts for a reason the structure of her action is one and the 
same with the structure of her reasons. Therefore, one can always read the 
agent’s reasons, what she intends and believes, off the structure of what she 
does. The slip, however, raises a problem in this regard. In it, the agent 
attempts to execute an intention. The attempt has a teleological structure. 
But in so far as the mistake is characterized by a mismatch between actions 
and reasons, such structure cannot be taken as a reflection of the agent’s 
reasons. Doing it would make the agent look irrational, which she is not, or 
would make the slip a kind of mistake that it is not. 
Consider the driving slip. It would certainly be wrong to say that 
you drove to your old place intentionally. Among others, you were 
probably surprised when you came to the realization of having done it. Yet, 
by contrast, there are many descriptions of what you did that capture what 
you took yourself to be doing at the time and that, in addition, display the 
kind of teleological structure characteristic of actions done for reasons: you 
                                                                                                                                                        
stricter reading of these passages and Sachs (1989) for a criticism of that 
reading. 
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walked to your car, drove out the parking lot, made a left turn, took the 
freeway, etc. You did some of these things as means for others. You did all 
of them in order to get home after a hard day’s work. Indeed, it is by virtue 
of having this teleological structure that your performance counts as a 
mistake. 
The problem for the Neo-Anscombean arises because this structure 
cannot be taken as a reflection of your intentions and beliefs at the time. In 
particular, it does not reflect the answers you would give to the how and 
why questions, which, according to this view, embody one’s reasons for 
action. To wit, had you been asked then how to get home, you would have 
probably described an alternate series of actions. Had you been asked why 
you were taking the freeway south given that you wanted to go your new 
place up north, you would have probably drawn a blank stare.  
In general, trying to read the agent’s reasons off the slip results in a 
distorted image of the agent. Acting on reasons that run contrary to what 
one knows is normally considered a hallmark of irrationality. Yet, the slip 
does not seem to be traceable to an irrational mind. Rather than involving 
agents who reason contrary to what they know, slips seem to involve 
agents who do not reason much at all. And whereas not reasoning enough 
is in some situations a sign of irrationality, say, if one reasons less than one 
ought to, the situations where slips happen tend not to be like this. For one 
thing, the slip normally happens in situations when not much reasoning is 
required.  
On the other hand, trying to read the agent’s reasons off the slip 
runs the risk of making the mistake more reasonable than what it really is. 
Hence, it tends to result as well in a distorted image of the mistake. 
Typically, what is puzzling about any given slip is not how the agent came 
to act for poor reasons but rather why, given that it was so easy for her, she 
failed to act in line with reasons she already accepted. It is symptomatic, in 
this regard, that as soon as the mistake is pointed out to them, slipsters 
tend to recognize it as such. They do not attempt to explain what they did 
appealing to reasons that would otherwise justify their actions.16 
Now, I said earlier that the argument from illusion should not be 
taken to establish positive conclusions about perception, for instance, that 
perceiving the world requires perceiving inner objects. Likewise, the 
argument from slips should not be asked to do more work than it actually 
does. In particular, to say that acting for a reason essentially involves an 
attempt to implement an intention is not to say that such actions involve a 
                                                            
16 For detailed discussions of the claims in the last two paragraphs, see 
Amaya (2013) and Amaya & Doris (2014). 
 12 
further inner act of attempting or trying, or that they are preceded by one 
of such acts.17 As in the perceptual case, making this kind of claims requires 
further argumentation.  
In comparison, the main claim behind the argument from slips is 
substantially more modest. Although the argument presupposes that 
behind every action there is an attempt to execute an intention, it is mostly 
silent on the nature of that attempt. By analogy with the perceptual case, all 
it says about it is that such attempts are reason involving and yet not settled 
by one’s reasons. They are reason involving in the sense that they suppose an 
agent acting for certain reasons. But they are not settled by them because 
the resulting attempt need not be successful in the light of what those 
reasons recommend. 
 
5. Is it action? 
 
Various philosophers, most notably, those who favor a disjunctive account 
of perception, have expressed skepticism about the argument from 
illusion.18 One of their main reasons is metaphysical. Not trusting the 
deliverances of introspection, disjunctivists think that successful and 
illusory episodes are not, appearances to the contrary, mental states of the 
same kind. Hence, for them, there is no need to posit a factor common to 
both cases. 19  
An analogous criticism could be leveled against the present 
argument. I have claimed that the slip involves an agent attempting to 
execute an intention. This is meant to explain why the mistake looks like a 
successful action. Yet, as in the perceptual case, one might insist here that 
appearances are misleading. Despite how things seem to the agent or to the 
external observer, one could argue that the “attempt” behind the slip is 
significantly different from the kind of attempt involved in successful 
                                                            
17  Hornsby (1980) and O’Shaughnessy (1980), for instance, seek to arrive to 
these claims by drawing on arguments that also parallel the argument from 
illusion. For cogent criticism of these arguments, see Dancy (1995) 
18 Different versions of the disjunctivist position can be found in Hinton 
(1973), McDowell (1982, 1986), Martin (2004). For general surveys of 
disjunctivism in perception, see the introduction of Haddock & McPherson 
(2008) and Crane (2011).  
19 Jonathan Dancy puts it as follows: “[T]he appeal to the deliverances of 
introspection is not generally allowed to be conclusive elsewhere, and there 
seems to be nothing special about the present case to warrant any more 
respectful attitude to introspection here.” (1995: 422) 
 13 
action. Not only does it fall short of being in line with the agent’s reasons. 
Not being sensitive to those reasons, it falls short of counting at all as the 
execution of an intention.  
I disagree. Clearly, some performances fit this mold. A person forms 
an intention, for instance, to let his climbing partner go off, which causes 
him to behave in certain ways that would otherwise seem intended: he gets 
so nervous that he lets his partner go off. As discussions of the causal 
theory of action have made it clear, such deviant cases ought not to count as 
instances of action (Davidson 1973; Bishop 1989). Even though the man is 
behaving according to his reasons, his behavior is not a rational response to 
them. Rather than being an execution of his intentions, it is a brute offshoot 
of them.  
The problem with the objection is that slips are only superficially like 
this sort of cases. In them, the resulting behavior falls short of being in line 
with one’s reasons, which gives the appearance of it being insensitive to 
them. The reality, however, is that things are quite different in this respect. 
What one does in the slip makes considerable sense in the light of one’s 
intentions and beliefs. In fact, the mistake normally comes close to being 
the right response to them. Consider this. You drove to your old place, not 
to your uncle’s house or to your friend’s living next door. And even if you 
called your partner by the wrong name, it is not as though you called her, 
say, by the name of the president or, more dramatically, by your own 
name. 
Crucially, these kinds of results are not due to happenstance. In fact, 
the patterns can be systematically observed. Whenever the slip is such that a 
new routine gets substituted by an inappropriate one, the substituting 
routine normally betrays an old habit. One does something that used to 
work in the past (Reason & Mycielska 1982; Reason 1984; Jónsdóttir et al 
2007). Likewise, in verbal slips lexical substitutions invariably involve 
words of the same syntactic categories and typically occur among 
semantically related items. Only rarely, the substitutions result in 
ungrammatical utterances or involve semantically distant words. (For a 
review of verbal slip corpora, see Poulisse 1999, ch. 1.) 
There is a sound and relatively simple explanation for this. In outline, 
slips can be viewed as instances of cognitive under-determination. What the 
agent does at the time is a response to her intentions and beliefs, although it 
is not fully shaped by them. Under-determination is common in everyday 
life. It happens when the need to act outstrips one’s readiness to deliberate, 
for instance, if one is driving tiredly after a hard day’s work, or if one is 
trying to catch one’s partner’s attention while keeping an eye on a fidgety 
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child. In such circumstances, not all the information one has is available for 
use.  Only a portion of it actively comes to mind. 
It is at this point that habits and familiar associations come in. In 
short, they play a role supplementing deliberation in structuring action. In 
particular, they help agents settle on ways of executing their intentions that 
are reasonable in the light of whatever information they are actively holding 
in mind.  Thus, if you intend to get back home, but you are not thinking 
about your recent move, taking the freeway south can seem a reasonable 
course of action. Plenty of times, following it that has taken you home 
alright. Similarly, if your intention is to alert your partner about the spill on 
the kitchen floor, it might be reasonable to blurt the first name that comes 
to mind. If you pause to think about the right name, you might not speak in 
time to prevent him from stepping on the spill. 
From this, the response to the objection follows. The slip, as I 
mentioned earlier, involves an execution of an intention. The execution is 
incorrect but is, nevertheless, a rational approximation to what the agent 
intended. Hence, it is not a case of a brute response, as deviant 
performances are supposed to be. In brief, the mistake not only results in 
behavior that is approximately correct. But whatever is right in it is not 
merely the result of an accident. It is, instead, the result of some of the 
routines by which habits and semantic familiarity reasonably shape what 
one does and what one says. 
 
6. Is it a glitch? 
 
Some philosophers have opposed the argument from illusion for 
epistemological reasons. Their criticism is that the argument gets the order of 
explanation wrong. It tries to draw basic conclusions about the nature of 
perception, overlooking the fact that the successful case has explanatory 
priority over the unsuccessful one. For these philosophers, one cannot 
understand the nature of perception by reflecting on defective perceptual 
experiences.  
The criticism could be extended to the argument from slips. In it, 
conclusions about the nature of action are derived from cases where things 
do not go as they should. That might seem problematic. The slip, one could 
argue, is a glitch or lapse in an otherwise successful endeavor. It happens 
because something interferes with the normal course of events. Thus, even 
if in it actions are not constituted by reasons, this does not reflect on the 
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nature of action proper. From a glitch or a lapse, one cannot infer how 
things normally work. 20 
I disagree with this objection, too. To see why, begin by 
distinguishing two things that are relevant to conceptualize a mistake. 
First, there are the standards by which the performance can be evaluated, 
that is, by which it can be said to be a success or a mistake. In the case of 
perception and action, such standards are relatively easy to state (or let’s 
assume here that they are easy to state). Perception ought be veridical; 
action is supposed to reveal the agent’s intentions and beliefs (Amaya 
2013).  
On the other hand, there are the standards by which one can evaluate 
the processes that lead to those performances. It is, typically, in terms of 
these that normal and impaired processing get distinguished, whether the 
impairment is pathological, or due to a temporary glitch. To illustrate, 
some of the ways in which perception can fail to be veridical are, in 
addition, evidence of shortcomings in this regard. Think, for instance, 
about hallucinations.  
Considered from a purely abstract point of view, it is clear that these 
standards can come apart. An unsuccessful performance may, in principle, 
result from an otherwise impeccable process. Moreover, there is evidence 
that in some human tasks this is actually the case. To take one famous 
example, in their landmark studies of inductive reasoning, Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky observed how their subjects’ intuitive 
judgments violated basic probabilistic principles.21 The violations, however, 
did not seem to result from misapplications of the probability calculus. It 
looked, instead, as if their subjects were tacitly relying on a limited number 
                                                            
20 Although he is not thinking about slips, Anton Ford (2011: 96) comes very 
close to stating this objection: “The anatomist who seeks a general theory of 
the human body does not concern herself indifferently with all bodies—the 
living and the dead alike—but exclusively with the living ones, and among 
the living, primarily with the healthy ones. Just so, a philosopher who aims 
at a general theory of action does not concern herself indifferently with all 
actions—the intentional and the unintentional alike—but exclusively with 
the intentional ones, and among the intentional, primarily with the ones 
that are undeformed.”  
21 The original research was presented in Kahneman and Tversky (1973), 
and discussed in Tversky and Kahneman (1982). Gigerenzer (1996) and 
Herwtick and Gigerenzer (1999) have forcefully criticized their 
interpretation, although the point illustrated in the text above still holds. 
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of familiar heuristics that, in more naturalistic scenarios, would be a 
reasonable guide to making likelihood estimates.   
In the case of the slip, the situation is analogous. In it, performances 
and processes also dissociate.22 Obviously, the slip is a mistake: the standard 
by which the performance counts as such are the agent’s intentions and 
beliefs. Even so, it is not as though the slip is the result of a glitch or a lapse 
in an otherwise foolproof process of intention execution. Indeed, it is doubtful 
that that process even exists. For every slip there might be some abstract 
practical syllogism recommending the right performance. But this is not to 
say that there is a procedure available to human agents for always coming 
up with it or for applying its conclusions correctly. In fact, to the extent that 
reasoning and applying conclusions are actions, it would seem that one 
could always make mistakes in doing either of these things.  
In general, human agents have clear processing limits. Our ability to 
store information vastly outstrips our ability to bring that information to 
mind. This is why cognitive under-determination can be so pervasive and 
why, on the face of it, our reliance on habits and familiar associations is 
something reasonable. It is a way of compensating for our limitations. 
What should be noticed, however, is that relying on them comes at a cost. It 
forces us to make trade-offs between our capacity to attend to various 
things, behave in flexible ways, and act in a timely manner. Think about it 
this way. You can follow an old habit mindlessly, which is a good thing if 
you are tired. But, in following it, you loose some flexibility. Likewise, you 
can decide on the fly what to say and say it. But you cannot attend to the all 
the words you utter then.23 
Overall, this is a strategy that works. It is typically sufficient to keep 
one afloat. Yet, to the extent that it forces us to make some compromises, 
there are situations in which the results are less than desirable. That is, like 
the use of heuristics in inductive judgment, what we have here is a piece of 
efficient psychology, whose advantages come at a performance cost. 
                                                            
22 In drawing the distinction between evaluating the reasonableness of 
performances and processes/mechanisms, I borrow from Michael Bratman 
(1987: 5.2), who distinguishes habits and general policies for (not) 
reconsidering plans from episodes of (non) reconsiderations. A precursor of 
Bratman’s treatment can be found is Herbert Simon’s (1957, 1983) 
distinction between substantive and procedural rationality. By analogy, we 
talk here of substantive and procedural success in action. 
23 For discussions of how these trade-offs manifest in detail in slip generated 
experimentally and naturalistically, see MacKay (1987), Reason (1983), and 
Baars (1992). 
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Internalized routines, such as habits, are past-dependent and, hence, yield 
the wrong solutions in novel conditions. Familiar associations are 
semantically speaking too coarse, which means that they might not be 
discriminative enough to convey an exact message. Hence, the strategy of 
relying on them, even if perfectly implemented, can result in a mistaken 
performance.  
To conclude, the objector is right to insist that one cannot infer 
conclusions about how things normally work from glitches or lapses. The 
problem is that slips are not glitches or lapses in normal functioning. 
Instead, they are side-effects of a psychology that allows humans agents to 
implement their intentions in an efficient way. Thanks to it, in normal life 




In this paper, I have introduced the argument from slips. Based on the idea 
that these mistakes are analogous to illusions but in the domain of action, I 
have shown how a parallel to Hume’s argument can be constructed. 
Whereas the latter was meant to challenge naïve realism in perception, the 
argument from slips targets some naïve views about the relation between 
reasons and actions inspired by Wittgenstein.  
I have also discussed how the argument from slips can be defended 
from objections similar to some raised in the perceptual case. Obviously, 
these are not the only possible objections to it. It remains to be seen as well 
whether my replies can be adapted to strengthen the parallel argument in 
the domain of perception.  
Ultimately, from the discussion of these objections a less naïve yet, I 
believe, a more realistic conception of human agency emerges. It is a view 
that recognizes that an important part of our being successful agents is our 
responsiveness to reasons. However, unlike the rationalist view challenged 
by the present argument, it seeks to do justice to the fact that human beings 
are limited creatures. Accordingly, it claims that our success also depends 
on relying on less than perfect habitual routines and associations. It is a 
view that makes our errors, as much as our successes, a mark of the kind of 
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